I, Sec. Fed. 61, 635 S.E.2d 353 (2006). Fed. Walker v. State, 281 Ga. 157, 635 S.E.2d 740 (2006), cert. Const., amend. - In a case in which the evidence showed that defendant, a convicted felon, used a firearm to shoot the deceased, a trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to quash the indictment under O.C.G.A. 813, 485 S.E.2d 39 (1997). Culpepper v. State, 312 Ga. App. Robinson v. State, 281 Ga. App. 16-5-1, two counts of aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. Fed. Certified copies of a defendant's out-of-state judgment of conviction, associated complaint, and plea hearing transcript were properly admitted into evidence to show that the defendant was a convicted felon for purposes of O.C.G.A. - Conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon could not stand because the same prior conviction could not support both recidivist sentencing and a conviction of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and also a nolo contendere plea could not serve as proof of a prior conviction for a charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; the prior conviction remained available to support enhanced sentencing as a recidivist, however. 1976, Art. 16-11-131. 16-11-131, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony murder in violation of O.C.G.A. Bryant v. State, 169 Ga. App. 105, 650 S.E.2d 767 (2007). Warren v. State, 289 Ga. App. A drug dealer told police that the drug dealer saw the defendant shoot the victim, although the drug dealer said at trial that the drug dealer did not see the shooting; the drug dealer's spouse testified as to a statement by the drug dealer that was inconsistent with the drug dealer's trial testimony; and another prosecution witness testified that before the shooting, the defendant said that the defendant was "going to get" the victim and that afterward, the defendant said, "I told you I was going to do" the victim. The law says guns are forbidden for those convicted of crimes that attract prison terms exceeding a year. Construction with O.C.G.A. Former Code 1933, 26-2914 (see now O.C.G.A. 130, 392 S.E.2d 896 (1990). - O.C.G.A. - It was proper under O.C.G.A. Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1996, "18 U.S.C. 572, 754 S.E.2d 151 (2014). Cade v. State, 351 Ga. App. Walker v. State, 281 Ga. 157, 635 S.E.2d 740 (2006), cert. Little v. State, 195 Ga. App. WebSPRINGFIELD, Ill. A federal jury returned a guilty verdict on February 22, 2023, against Aaron Jackson, 30, of Springfield, Ill. for knowingly possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. 323, 504 S.E.2d 19 (1998); Adams v. State, 239 Ga. App. Campbell v. State, 279 Ga. App. 372, 626 S.E.2d 567 (2006). - Possession of an antique shotgun while a convicted felon was sufficient to sustain a conviction under O.C.G.A. Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon as the conviction was supported by more evidence than just defendant's mere spatial proximity to the gun because: (1) the jury could have inferred that defendant actually lived in the apartment rented by defendant's sister and that the items found in the apartment belonged to defendant; and (2) the gun was found in plain view on the television, which defendant claimed as defendant's own, next to defendant's keys to the apartment. 16-11-131(a)(2). - Because the only evidence before the jury regarding the defendant's status as a convicted felon was the entry of a guilty plea to a crime that could have been either a felony or a misdemeanor, the evidence failed to provide the jury with a sufficient basis for finding that element beyond a reasonable doubt; consequently, the defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon had to be reversed. 657, 350 S.E.2d 302 (1986). ), 44 A.L.R. Fact that weapon was acquired for self-defense or to prevent its use against defendant as defense in prosecution for violation of state statute prohibiting persons under indictment for, or convicted of, crime from acquiring, having, carrying, or using firearms or weapons, 39 A.L.R.4th 967. Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to bifurcate and separately try the count for being a felon in possession of a firearm because bifurcation was not authorized when the charge of being a felon in possession served as the underlying felony for felony murder. 611 et seq. denied, 506 U.S. 839, 113 S. Ct. 118, 121 L. Ed. Rev. 16-11-131, because in determining whether a sentence is a felony, the established consideration is what sentence can be imposed under the law, not what was imposed. Balloon Payments in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Proceedings, 44 A.L.R. Evidence that handguns belonging to a passenger in a defendant's car, that the handguns were within an arm's reach of the defendant during the commission of felony drug offenses, that the defendant knew that the passenger carried guns for protection while in the drug trade in which the defendant actively participated, and that the defendant was a first offender probationer was sufficient to show that the defendant jointly and constructively possessed the handguns in violation of O.C.G.A. 16-5-1 and on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of O.C.G.A. 16-11-131) was only an additional qualification to requirements presently provided in former Code 1933, 26-2904 (see now O.C.G.A. (a) Criminal possession of a weapon by a convicted felon is possession of any weapon by a person who: (1) Has been convicted of a person felony or a violation of article 57 of chapter 21 of the Kansas Statutes Lawson v. State, 280 Ga. 881, 635 S.E.2d 134 (2006). 0:02. 174, 764 S.E.2d 187 (2014); Patterson v. State, 347 Ga. App. 16-11-131; two witnesses testified that the defendant had told the witnesses that the defendant shot the victim, and one of the witnesses testified that the defendant stated that the shooting occurred during a robbery, the defendant discarded a gun that was later found to be the murder weapon while fleeing police on another crime, and the defendant admitted to police that the murder weapon was the defendant's, that the defendant stole $100 from the victims, and that the defendant shot the murder victim. 324, 316 S.E.2d 791, rev'd on other grounds, 253 Ga. 429, 322 S.E.2d 228 (1984), overruled in part by Ross v. State, 279 Ga. 365, 614 S.E.2d 31 (2005). - Testimony by a ballistics expert proving the operability of the firearm is not required for conviction under O.C.G.A. Suluki v. State, 302 Ga. App. denied, 552 U.S. 833, 128 S. Ct. 60, 169 L. Ed. Ingram v. State, 240 Ga. App. Johnson v. State, 282 Ga. 235, 647 S.E.2d 48 (2007). 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. Conducting a trial on a possession of a firearm charge prior to the sentencing phase and before the same jury that imposed a death sentence on a defendant did not unnecessarily prejudice the jury by impermissibly placing the defendant's character in issue in the sentencing phase since the state could have introduced evidence of the defendant's prior convictions during the sentencing phase. 847, 368 S.E.2d 771, cert. Malone v. State, 337 Ga. App. denied, No. 734, 783 S.E.2d 133 (2016). Cobb v. State, 283 Ga. 388, 658 S.E.2d 750 (2008). - Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1988, "of" was deleted following "Chapter " in subsection (e) (now (f)). Evidence supported a defendant's conviction of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon even though the only evidence presented during the separate guilt/innocence phase on that charge was the certified copy of the defendant's indictment, guilty plea, and sentence for the felony offense of theft by taking; the jury was properly instructed that the jury was authorized to consider the evidence presented in the first guilt/innocence phase of the trial, as well as the evidence presented in the second guilt/innocence phase, in reaching the jury's verdict regarding the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. 899, 379 S.E.2d 199 (1989); Clark v. State, 206 Ga. App. Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon based on the gun being found in close physical proximity to the defendant and that the defendant had in a pocket the exact number of the proper caliber bullets to completely reload the gun; although others had access to the car before the defendant took possession of the car, the evidence authorized the conclusion that the car had been visually inspected at a point close in time to when the defendant had sole access. However, because the defendant possessed all six of the long guns simultaneously, those six counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon involving the long guns merged for purposes of sentencing. Johnson v. State, 203 Ga. App. Under Texas Penal Code 12.33, 46.04, the unlawful possession of a firearm is a third-degree felony with a punishment range of two to ten years for a defendant with 16-3-21 and16-11-138, then it could not be said that the defendant was committing a felony when the defendant shot the victim, and the preclusive bar of 16-3-21(b)(2) would not apply. Stephens v. State, 279 Ga. 43, 609 S.E.2d 344 (2005). 1983, Art. Admission of a certified copy of defendant's five-year sentence for a prior conviction of armed robbery showing both that defendant had pled guilty to armed robbery and that defendant had been represented by counsel satisfied the requirement of O.C.G.A. 444, 313 S.E.2d 144 (1984). - Police search of a defendant's bag and person, which produced handguns, cocaine, cash, and other drugs was lawful because the search was made pursuant to the police officers' lawful warrantless arrest of the defendant when the defendant arrived at a motel room exactly answering a detailed description provided by a confidential informant, who stated that the defendant would be carrying a shoulder bag containing drugs and a loaded handgun. - One charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon was prohibited from collaterally attacking a prior felony conviction that served as the predicate offense since O.C.G.A. You're all set! 16-11-131(b) merely based on circumstantial evidence that failed, in violation of former O.C.G.A. Evidence was sufficient to find the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter in violation of O.C.G.A. There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's convictions of malice murder, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony; the defendant and the victim lived in the same rooming house where the defendant often intimidated the victim and demanded money from the victim, on the night of the crime the defendant sent the victim to buy crack cocaine and became angry when the victim returned empty-handed, the defendant argued with the victim and shot the victim in the eye, and at the hospital the victim repeatedly declined to say who shot the victim, except to say that a person with a first name other than the defendant's shot the victim accidentally.